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BRANDENBURG AND THE UNITED STATES' WAR ON
INCITEMENT ABROAD: DEFENDING A DOUBLE STANDARD

Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky*

[E]very nation must have avenues for the peaceful expression
of opinion and dissent. When these avenues are closed, the
temptation to speak through violence grows.
-President George W. Bush'

We have nothing to fear from the demoralizing reasoningsof
some, if others are left free to demonstrate their errors ....
-Thomas Jefferson "
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although a handful of media incitement cases have made
headlines in the last few years,3 the chance of a member of the
* University of Florida Research Foundation Professor, Levin College of
Law.
The Author thanks David Anderson, Charles Collier, Ronald
Krotoszynski, Jr., Tom Cotter, Bill Page, Marty McMahon, Frank McCoy,
Michael Shiver, Chris Slobogin, and, as always, Howard Lidsky. This Article
benefited from the research assistance of Sherica Bryan and Robert Luck. If

you have comments, please email: lidsky@law.ufl.edu.
1. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President to the United
Nations General Assembly (Nov. 10, 2001), available at httpj/www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011110-3.html.
2. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 n.2 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Jefferson as referenced by Charles A. Beard, NATION, July

7, 1926, at 8).
3. See, e.g., Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 242-43 (4th Cir.
1997) (holding that the First Amendment did not preclude liability for aiding
and abetting a crime through the publication of the Hit Man manual, even if
the manual did not constitute incitement); Davidson v. Time Warner, Inc., No.
Civ.A-V-94-006, 1997 WL 405907, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 1997) (involving
survivors of slain police officer who brought an unsuccessful action against
record label for producing violent music that allegedly incited the shooting
death of the officer); Byers v. Edmondson, 97-0831 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/15/98, 712
So. 2d (NaturalBorn Killers case); Rodney A. Smolla, Should the Brandenburg
v. Ohio Incitement Test Apply in Media Violence Tort Cases?, 27 N. KY. L. REV.
1, 2-8 (2000) (discussing five court cases concerning potential media liability for
1009
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mainstream media being held liable for inciting its audience to
violence is exceedingly remote.4 Even if state tort law permits a
plaintiff to bring a case for incitement,5 Brandenburg v. Ohio6 sets
the First Amendment bar to liability in incitement cases so high as
to be almost insurmountable.7 In Brandenburg, the United States
Supreme Court held that a state may not punish advocacy of violent
action unless "such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action."8 As a practical matter, liability may not be based on a
speculative connection between speech and harm; the connection
must be clear, direct, and immediate.! Brandenburg thus spreads a
broad mantle of protection over the speech of radical political
dissidents from even the most despised groups in society. °
The United States has expressed justifiable pride over the
protection Brandenburgextends to the speech of political dissidents.
Indeed, the United States considers the Brandenburg standard so
fundamental that the Senate has entered reservations to several
international human rights treaties to ensure that the Brandenburg
incitement).
4. See Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir.
1987) (reversing trial court and holding that magazine article discussing
autoerotic asphyxia was protected by the First Amendment); Sanders v.
Acclaim Entm't, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1281-82 (D. Colo. 2002) (dismissing
action by survivors of teacher killed in Columbine High School shootings
against video game and movie companies for allegedly inciting the killing
spree); Davidson, 1997 WL 405907, at *2 (granting summary judgment for
defendant because the plaintiff was unable to make out a prima facie case);
McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming
trial court's dismissal of suit against musician Ozzy Osbourne for allegedly
causing a teenager to commit suicide). But see Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc. 539
P.2d 36, 42 (Cal. 1975) (upholding judgment against radio disc jockey who
negligently caused radio listeners to engage in dangerous driving which
resulted in a deadly accident); Estate of Amedure v. Warner Bros., No. 95494536-NZ (Oakland County Cir. Ct., Mich. May 24, 1999) (entering judgment
against the Jenny Jones Show).
5. See generally David A. Anderson, Incitement and Tort Law, 37 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 957 (2002).
6. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
7. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 986 (stating that he found no cases in
which liability was imposed on the media on the basis of inciting physical
harm).
8. 395 U.S. at 447.
9. The speaker must intend to promote "imminent lawless action" that is
"likely" to occur. Id. The Court has explicitly distinguished incitement from
"mere advocacy" of violence. Id. at 448-49.
10. But see David R. Dow & R. Scott Shieldes, Rethinking the Clear and
PresentDanger Test, 73 IND. L.J. 1217 (1998) (arguing that Brandenburg is not
protective enough).
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standard will be applied to the United States media." Nevertheless,
the United States has actively called for the suppression of speech in
the foreign media that falls far short of the incitement standards set
forth in Brandenburg. Even before September 11, 2001, the United
States government encouraged and even participated in censorship
of inciting propaganda in foreign media that would not meet the
Brandenburgtest of incitement. 1
The war on terrorism, however, has made incitement in the
Middle East of special concern to the current administration.'" Both
President Bush and Congress have called for an end to incitement in
the Middle East, although the incitement to which they refer seems
to include simple advocacy of violence as well as true incitement."
Of more concern, United States officials have gone so far as to ask
the autocratic government of Qatar to censor Al-Jazeera, the only
even arguably independent television station in the region, and an
important
to legitimate
Arab publicforopinion."
While contributor
it is perfectly
the United States to attempt

11. See, e.g., United States Initial Report to the United Nations Committee
on The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Part II.B.1 (Sept. 2000), at httpJi/wwl.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/cerdinitial.
html. The reservations were to Article 20(2) of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which requires parties to prohibit "[any advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence," International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), at http:/wwl.umn.edu/humanrtsinstreeb3ccpr.htm,
and to Article 4 on the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination which requires punishment of "dissemination of ideas based on
racial superiority or hatred [and] incitement to racial discrimination." United
States Initial Report to the United Nations Committee on The Convention on
EliminationofAll Forms of Racial Discrimination,supra at Part II.B. 1; see also
William B. Fisch, Hate Speech in the ConstitutionalLaw of the United States, 50
AM. J. CoMp.L. 463, 463-64 & n.2 (2002).
12. In 1999, for example, the North American Treaty Organization
("NATO") created a tribunal to shut down radio and television stations that
were spreading propaganda in Kosovo. Steven Erlanger, NATO Peacekeepers
Plan a System of Controls for the News Media in Kosovo, N.Y. Ti.IES, Aug. 16,
1999, at A8; see Laura R. Palmer, A Very Clear and Present Danger: Hate
Speech, Media Reform, and Post-Conflict Democratization in Kosovo, 26 YALE J.
INT'L L. 179, 180-82 (2001) (noting American "exceptionalism... in the domain
of free expression" and supporting restrictions on the press in Kosovo in light of
the fragility of the country's post-conflict transition to democracy).
13. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 1 (stating that the United States will do "all
in [its] power" to stop "incitement, violence, and terror").
14. See id.
15. See Joel Campagna, Between Two Worlds: Qatar'sAIJazeera Satellite
Channel Faces Conflicting Expectations, SPECIAL REPORT (Oct. 2001), at
www.cpj.org/Briefings/2001/al.jazeera-octO1/aljazeera-oct01.html.
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to persuade foreign citizens and media not to engage in advocacy of
violent acts, the administration's rhetoric suggests that the United
States expects foreign governments to take action against speech
that would be protected by the First Amendment in the United
States. What explains this apparent hypocrisy? Is this simply
another example of the United States touting democracy at home
while supporting despotism abroad?
Or is the Brandenburg
incitement standard so socially and culturally contingent that it is
not appropriate for export, at least to the Arab Middle East? My
ultimate goal in this Article is to explore whether, as part of the war
on terror, the United States ought to support or even demand
censorship of incitement abroad that falls short of true incitement as
defined by Brandenburg. More fundamentally, however, this Article
will attempt to demonstrate that Brandenburg both assumes the
existence of, and helps constitute, a distinctively American
"marketplace of ideas" that makes Brandenburg appropriate here
but unfit for export to many other countries.
II.

THE AL-JAZEERA CONTROVERSY

At the outset, it is appropriate to give some context to the
debate over Al-Jazeera. AI-Jazeera, the first and only twenty-fourhour Arabic-language news channel,"6 has been dubbed the "CNN of
the Middle East." 7 Based in the tiny Middle Eastern country of
Qatar, whose population is less than 700,000, Al-Jazeera reaches
thirty-five million viewers in the Arab world and beyond. 8 Although
AI-Jazeera received its initial funding from the Emir of Qatar, 9 it
16.

MOHAMMED EL-NAWAWY

& ADEL ISKANDAR,

AL-JAZEERA: HOW THE FREE

ARAB NEWS NETWORK SCOOPED THE WORLD AND CHANGED THE MIDDLE EAST

(2002); see also Rick Zednik, Inside Al Jazeera, COLUM.

JOURNALISM REV.,

24

Mar.-

Apr. 2002, at 44, 45 ("Al Jazeera is the only twenty-four-hour Arab news
station.").
17. See, e.g., Roger Simon, Waging the Spin War, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Oct. 22, 2001, at 29 (employing this term). It is ironic that Al-Jazeera has been
the prime target of criticism. For example, Al-Jazeera's programming is
moderate in comparison to the explicit propaganda found on Lebanon's AlManar, the official television station of Hezbollah. Deborah Blachor, Hezbollah
TV Hate Message Big on W. Bank, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 12, 2002, at 31.
18. EL-NAWAWY & ISKANDAR, supra note 16, at 34.
19. Id. at 33. Despite its hard-hitting coverage of other Middle Eastern
governments, A-Jazeera has avoided criticism of the monarchy in Qatar. Id. at
83. The creation of Al-Jazeera was "part of an effort to modernize and
democratize Qatar." Zednik, supra note 16, at 44. The station manager has
stated that A1-Jazeera is not currently subsidized by the Qatari government.
Id. at 47. Some have argued that the Qatari government "use[s Al-Jazeeral as a
[public relations] tool for the outside world . . . ." EL-NAWAwY & ISKANDAR,
supra note 16, at 86 (quoting the former chairman of Qatar University's
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enjoys a degree of editorial freedom that sets it apart from the other
Arabic-language stations in the region.
Its uncensored news
coverage and free-wheeling discussions of hot-button political,
cultural, and social issues are unparalleled in a region where statecontrolled television is the norm. A1-Jazeera's talk shows and call-in
shows are particularly popular, as is its willingness to deal with
taboo subjects in the Middle East, such as the equality of women,
polygamy, female circumcision, normalization of relations with
Israel, and government corruption. 2' Al-Jazeera's controversial and
inflammatory programming makes it one of the most watched news
stations in the region. 21 Indeed, so influential is A1-Jazeera that
numerous Middle Eastern governments have filed complaints about
its programming with the government of Qatar. Tunisia and Libya
temporarily withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar after AlJazeera broadcast material critical of their governments, and, most
recently, Jordan temporarily closed the Al-Jazeera bureau there for
negative coverage of its government. V
However, most Americans did not become acquainted with AlJazeera until October of 2001. Al-Jazeera was the only foreign news
outlet allowed to stay in Taliban-held Afghanistan during the first
part of the war on terror.2 Al-Jazeera's singular access allowed it to
obtain "live footage of bombs falling on Kabul,"' as well as "the only
video pictures of Afghan demonstrators attacking and setting fire to
the United States embassy."' Al-Jazeera also repeatedly aired an
exclusive 1999 interview with Osama bin Laden. 6 More startling

Communications Department).
20. Zednik, supra note 16, at 45.
A1-Jazeera has promoted "the
empowerment of Arab women to exercise their right to seek and receive
information and ideas." EL-NAWAWY & ISKANDAR, supra note 16, at 59; see also
Kai Hafez, Introduction: Mass Media in the Middle East: Patterns of Poltical
and Societal Change, in MASS MEDIA,

POLITICS & SOCIETY IN TIlE MIDDLE

Esr 7

(Kai Hafez ed., 2001) ("The only TV channel (in the Arab world] that deserves to
be called 'diverse' is Al-Jazeera. .. ").

21. Zednik, supra note 16, at 47 (asserting that AI-Jazeera is "the region's
most-viewed news network and second-most-watched pan-Arab station"). But
see Fouad Ajami, What the Muslim World Is Watching, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18,
2001 (Magazine), at 48, 78 (noting that other Arab channels, like the Londonbased Middle East Broadcasting Centre and Lebanese Broadcasting
International, reach "much wider audiences").
22. Zednik, supra note 16, at 47.
23. Ajami, supra note 21, at 51.
24. Zednik, supra note 16, at 45.
25. A1-Jazeera Goes It Alone (BBC News television broadcast, Oct. 8, 2001,
available at http'//news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/media-reportsl1579
929.stm.
26. Zednik, supra note 16, at 45.
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still was Al-Jazeera's October broadcast of a "home movie" of Osama
bin Laden gloating over the September 11 attacks, which
subsequently was picked up by other media around the world.27
Since then, Al-Jazeera repeatedly has "scooped" all other television
news networks by obtaining interviews with bin Laden (one of which
it chose not to air)," and footage and messages from A1-Qaeda. 2
Most recently, on November 12, 2002, Al-Jazeera broadcast a
recording, said to be of bin Laden, praising recent terror attacks and
threatening future attacks."
Perhaps understandably, American policymakers have
questioned whether AI-Jazeera is, in fact, an objective news outlet or
a willing weapon in A1-Qaeda's propaganda war against the United
States.3 In early October of 2001, United States Vice President
Dick Cheney met with the Emir of Qatar, asking him to rein in AlJazeera's anti-Americanism and to prevent the station from acting
as a mouthpiece for bin Laden." The United States government also
filed a formal diplomatic complaint with the government of Qatar,
on the ground that its inflammatory coverage was inciting Arab
public opinion against the United States.33 This did not deter AlJazeera, however. It aired a bin Laden tape and another tape
34
containing Al-Qaeda military propaganda on November 3, 2001,
which again was picked up by CNN and other Western media." A
few days later, on November 13, a United States bomb destroyed the
Kabul bureau of Al-Jazeera. Although United States government
officials claimed the bombing was accidental, their denials were met

27. James Risen & Patrick E. Tyler, A Nation Challenged: Propaganda;
Interview With bin Laden Makes the Rounds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at B5
(placing the date of the release of the "home movie" of bin Laden as October 7,
2001).
28. See id. (placing the date of the interview with bin Laden, which AlJazeera did not broadcast, as October 20, 2001).
29. See EL NAwAwY & ISKANDAR, supra note 16, at 155 (mentioning a
December 27, 2001 broadcast of a tape received from bin Laden).
30. James Risen & Neil MacFarquhar, New Recording May Be Threat From
bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2002, at Al (discussing the broadcast).
31. See, e.g., EL-NAWAWY & ISKANDAR, supra note 16, at 155-56 (noting that
critics have argued that AI-Jazeera is a propaganda outlet for bin Laden);
Michael Hirsh, Bush and the World, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 27
(arguing that the message of extremist Islam "is carried daily by Al-Jazeera, the
pan-Arab 'news' station").
32. Zednik, supra note 16, at 47.
33. EL-NAWAWY & ISKANDAR, supra note 16, at 175-76.
34. Id. at 153.
35. Id. at 154.
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with a great deal of skepticism, both by Al-Jazeera itself" and by
independent commentators.
Since then, at least one influential commentator, Fouad
Ajami, has accused A1-Jazeera of making bin Laden its "star" and of
"deliberately fan[ning] the flames of Muslim outrage.'
Ajami gave
dramatic examples of Al-Jazeera's anti-Western and anti-Semitic
bias, and of its tendency to cater to its viewers' rage against the
West.39 Indeed, Al-Jazeera gave widespread airplay to the notions
that bin Laden was not responsible for September 11 and that the
war in Afghanistan was simply an American crusade against
Muslims.' °
A-Jazeera has also fueled Palestinian rage by
repeatedly showing the photo of a dead Palestinian boy allegedly
shot by Israeli soldiers and by referring to suicide bombers as
"martyrs."' Ajami urged the United States to treat AI-Jazeera as a
"dangerous force," whose "virulent anti-American bias undercuts all
of its virtues."42 After its initial forays in attempting to silence AlJazeera, however, the Bush administration appears to have shifted
to trying to beat AI-Jazeera at its own game. Administration
officials have gone on A1-Jazeera to explain United States policy
directly to the Arab world,43 and the administration has also hired a
Madison Avenue advertising guru to improve the United States'
image abroad." The Bush administration, thus, seems to be shifting
from a command model to a persuasion model in an effort to
influence coverage of the war on terror in the Middle East.
The controversy over A1-Jazeera remains important, however,
because it raises larger issues about how the United States ought to
address virulent anti-Americanism in Middle Eastern media-an
issue that will almost certainly resurface if the United States
invades Iraq. Clearly, the United States already has an "image
problem"' in the Arab Middle East, and the attempt of the United
States to use its muscle to silence negative coverage on Al-Jazeera
opened its policy to attack as yet another instance of America
36. Id. at 169.
37. Nik Gowing, Full Text of Nik Gowing's AI-Jazeera Feature, MEDIA
GUARDILAN (Apr. 8, 2002) (saying that the bombing of Al-Jazeera's Kabul bureau
raises "sinister" questions), at http'//media.guardian.co.uklmediaguardian/story/0,7558,679641,00.html.
38. Ajami, supranote 21, at 48, 50.
39. See id. at 50.
40. See id. at 53, 76.
41. Id. at 50.
42. Id. at 78.
43. EL-NAWAWY & ISKANDAR, supra note 16, at 157-58.
44. Ajami, supra note 21, at 78.
45. Peter G. Peterson, Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism,
FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 76-77.
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applying a "double standard' 6 in the Middle East. This criticism is
particularly troubling in light of the fact that Al-Jazeera is the only
even arguably independent television station in a region whose
media is so state-dominated that in August 1990 it "withheld news
of Iraq's conquest of Kuwait for three days."47 The double standard
criticism also draws its force from the fact that the United States
government would not use such heavy-handed tactics against the
United States media, or, most likely, even against other Western
media. For example, a French author wrote a book claiming that
the United States government fabricated the events of September
11.48 The book became a bestseller in France and is being published
in the United States. 49 Still, the United States government has not
accused the French of inciting their citizens against Americans, nor
has the United States leaned on the French government to take
action against the author.
Some will simply respond that governmental hypocrisy is fine in
the name of protecting United States interests. According to this
argument, just as we support an autocratic regime in Saudi Arabia
because we need them as an ally," so should we encourage
government censorship of anti-Americanism on Al-Jazeera. Yet
even as an exercise in realpolitik, the Bush administration's heavyhandedness in trying to muzzle A1-Jazeera has been a failure.
Accusations that the United States applies double standards in its
dealings with Arab countries have been used to stir Arab public
46. JOHN L. ESPOSITO & JOHN 0. VOLL, ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY 201 (1996)
(stating that there is a "perception and charge that the U.S. and European
governments are guilty of employing a 'double standard,' a democratic one for
the West and selected allies and another for the Middle East and Islamic
movements"); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 184 (1996) (noting that "non-Westerners" are quick
to point out Western double standards, and arguing that "Idlouble standards in
practice are the unavoidable price of universal standards of principle"); BASSAM
TIBI, THE CHALLENGE OF FUNDAMENTALISM:

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE NEW

WORLD DISORDER 185 (1998) (observing that "the West, despite all its lip

service, has not been favorable to the democratization process in the World of
Islam"); Peterson, supra note 45, at 76-77 (stating that United States support
for "autocratic regimes" in the Middle East underlies much of the "negative
attitudes [of Middle Easterners] toward the United States").
47. EL-NAWAWY & ISKANDAR, supra note 16, at 68 (noting that in Syria,
Iraq, Sudan, and Libya "there is virtually no freedom of the press" and that
although there is an "opposition press of sorts" in Jordan and Egypt, it is tightly
constrained in criticism of the government); Ajami, supra note 21, at 78.
48. THIERRY MEYSSAN, 9/11 THE BIG LIE (2002).
49. Scott Shane, Viewing 9/11 as the Big Lie, BALT. SUN, Sept. 12, 2002, at
2A.
50. For acerbic criticism of our hypocrisy in this regard, see Maureen Dowd,
I'm With Dick! Let's Make War!, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2002, at A19.
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opinion against the United States and even (by some) to justify
violence and terrorism."1 Thus, before the United States can even
argue persuasively that Middle Eastern media should engage in
self-censorship, the United States must be able to make a case for
censorship of speech abroad that would be protected at home.
The case for American exceptionalism 2 can and should be made
to refute the charge that we are applying a double standard in the
Middle East. Absent adequate justification (and perhaps even with
adequate justification), attempts to silence Al-Jazeera or other
Middle Eastern media are likely to cause the United States more
harm than good. More to the point, if we are sanguine about
condemning the media in foreign countries as being too incendiary
and inciting public opinion, we run the risk of becoming unduly
cavalier in making accusations of incitement against our own media.
Especially during war-time,o it is important to remind ourselves of
the features of American political discourse that permit us to
tolerate radical dissent and inflammatory speech. As Professor
Steven Shiffrin has written: "If the first amendment is to serve as
an important cultural symbol, the modes of justification we use to
persuade ourselves and others of its value and importance are
themselves of special importance."s A review of the philosophical
foundations of Brandenburg may help us to remember why we
should tolerate radical dissent at home even in times of war and
should aid us in avoiding the trap laid by fear.'
III.

THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS ENVISIONED BY BRANDENBURG

Brandenburgv. Ohio56 is the dominant case in the United States
51. See EsPosrro & VOLL, supra note 46, at 201.
52. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HAitRv. L. REV.
633, 729 (2000) ("[Ilt is . . . important to recognize that America really is
exceptional .... Despite our present military and cultural hegemony, we should

be very reluctant to hold the American system up as an ideal for aspiring
democracies throughout the world.").
53. See generally Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32

HARv. L. REV. 932 (1919) (discussing First Amendment rights in the context of
the Espionage Act of 1917 and World War I).
54. STEvEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCIACY, AND ROMDANCE

110-11 (1990).
55. See Sandra Coliver, Commentary on the Johannesburg Principles on
National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, in
SECRECY AND LIBERTY: NATIONAL SECURITY, FREEDOM OF EXPaRESSION AND AccESS

TO INFORMATION 11, 13 (Sandra Coliver et. al. eds., 1999) ("Courts in countries

around the world tend to demonstrate the least independence and greatest
deference to the claims of government when national security is invoked.").
56. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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protecting the right of citizens to advocate lawless action. Although
Brandenburg announces the current test for incitement, it is the
context of the case that makes its protection of speech advocating
violence so extraordinary. In Brandenburg, the Supreme Court
defended the First Amendment right of a hooded Ku Klux Klan
speaker to exhort his audience to "Is]end the Jews back to Israel,"
and to "[blury the niggers." 7 The speaker further stated that if the
government "continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's
possible that there might have to be some revengeance [sic] taken." 8
The speech took place at an "organizers' meeting" of the Klan, at
which some of the attendees were clearly armed.59
In striking down Ohio's prosecution of the speaker for
advocating criminal activity, the Court stated that the First
Amendment does not allow "a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy
of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action."" Therefore, in order for a
speaker to be prosecuted for incitement, the State must show: (1)
intent to incite another; (2) to imminent violence; and (3) in a
context that makes it highly likely that such violence will occur."
The test seeks to ensure that suppression of speech is not based on
fear or dislike of radical ideas and radical speakers. As Professor
Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy has written "Brandenburg, properly
understood . . . governs abstract exhortations to lawless action
which might incite a sufficiently susceptible person to action." 2 In
application, however, Brandenburg assumes most citizens are not
susceptible to the impassioned rhetoric of a radical speaker.
The Brandenburgincitement test did not materialize from thin
air. Brandenburg represents the fruition of a libertarian theory of
free speech planted by Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis D.
Brandeis6 3 in a series of (mostly) dissenting opinions in cases

57. Id. at 446 n.1.
58. Id. at 446.
59. Id. at 445-46.
60. Id. at 447.
61. See S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,
Recalibratingthe Cost of HarmAdvocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1159, 1194 (2000) (indicating that "[slince Brandenburg, the
imminence requirement has become the central focus of the test").
62. S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Taming TerroristsBut Not "NaturalBorn
Killers," 27 N. KY. L. REV. 81, 85 (2000).
63. But see MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS
LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 108 (1991) ("Unfortunately, upon close
examination, virtually all of Holmes's reputation as the great modern defender
of civil liberty rests on the last paragraph of the Abrams dissent.").
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brought against war protestors and social radicals following World
War i' In these decisions, Holmes and Brandeis eloquently and
forcefully developed our modem theory of the First Amendment-a
theory predicated on a particular type of relationship between the
citizen and the state, a particular model of political discourse, and
even a particular type of citizen.
Linguistically, Brandenburg's antecedent was the clear and
present danger test, which made its first Supreme Court appearance
in Justice Holmes's opinion in Schenck v. United States.f' Schenck
involved a felony conviction under the Espionage Act of 1917 for
publishing pamphlets critical of the United States war effort and
targeted to men who had been drafted to fight in World War I."
Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, identified the relevant
question in determining the constitutionality of the Espionage Act
as whether the speaker's words "create[d] a clear and present
danger that they [would] bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent." 67 As applied, however, the clear
and present danger test focused merely on the "tendency" of
defendant's speech to interfere with the draft; Holmes did not
demand any proof that the pamphlets actually interfered with the
war effort.'
Thus, the Supreme Court unanimously upheld the
defendant's conviction; the clear and present danger test justified
suppression of radical speech rather than protection of it.
64. See David M. Rabban, The Emergence of the Modern First Amendment
Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1317 (1983) (discussing the lineage of Holmes

and Brandeis dissents).
65. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). The application of an incitement test in this
context, however, originated not with Holmes, but with Judge Learned Hand's
opinion inMassesPubl'gCo. v. Patten,244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F.

24 (2d Cir. 1917). See Dow & Shieldes, supra note 10, at 1223 (citing GEmALD
GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 151 (1994)). Moreover,
Zechariah Chafee stated that Holmes had "drawn[n] the boundary line very
close to the test of incitement at common law." ZECHARIAH CRAFEE, JR.,
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 89 (1920).
66. 249 U.S. at 48-49.
67. Id. at 52.
68. Id. ("If the act, (speaking, or circulating a paper,) its tendency and the
intent with which it is done are the same, we perceive no ground for saying that
success alone warrants making the act a crime."); see also Rabban, supra note
64, at 1229 (discussing the "bad tendency" approach to speech). A week after
Schenck was decided, Holmes also affirmed convictions under the Espionage Act
in Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919), and Debs v. United States,
249 U.S. 211 (1919). See also G. Edward White, The FirstAmendment Comes of
Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-Centurn America, 95 MWCH. L.
REV. 299, 318 (1996) (stating that "[a]t least until Abrams, Holmes did not
appear to treat his celebrated 'clear and present danger' dictum in Schenck as
incompatible with the bad tendency test").
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Shortly afterward, however, Holmes, with some prompting
from libertarian thinkers, 69 recast the clear and present danger test
in order to protect speech. In Abrams v. United States,7 ' Holmes
(and Brandeis) dissented from the prosecution of five Russian
socialist immigrants for distributing pamphlets protesting United
States involvement in World War I.1 Although Holmes had nothing
but contempt for the "creed" that the defendants "avow[ed] ,' he
believed that the speech of "these poor and puny anonymities" had
little chance of hindering the war effort and that the government
had failed to establish that the defendant specifically intended to
hinder that effort. 3 Instead of focusing on the "tendency" of
defendant's speech to hinder the war effort, Holmes argued that
speech may not be suppressed unless it presents an imminent threat
of "immediate" harm:"
"Only the emergency that makes it
immediately dangerous to leave the correction of evil counsels to
time warrants making any exception to the [First Amendment].""
Thus formulated, Holmes's clear and present danger test makes
several fundamental assumptions about American political
discourse. First, the correction of evil counsels can be left "to time"
because rationalism will ultimately prevail. 6 Professor G. Edward
White has noted that Holmes was a "modernist," by which he
means, among other things, that Holmes believed that "humans are
inherently rational beings." 7 Given enough time for reflection,
Holmes believed that human beings would reject unsound creeds
69. Judge Learned Hand wrote to Holmes to persuade him that the
incitement test was preferable to the test laid out in Schenck. Gerald Gunther,
Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some
Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 758-59 (1975); see also G. EDWARD
WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF

420-30

(1993) (discussing the influence of Harold Laski, Felix Frankfurter, and
Zechariah Chafee on the evolution of Holmes's views in the spring and summer
of 1919); Chafee, supra note 53, at 969 (praising the clear and present danger
test as protecting freedom of speech).
70. 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 628-29.
72. Id. at 629.
73. Id. ("I think the intent must be the specific intent that I have described
and for the reasons that I have given I think that no such intent was proved or
existed in fact.").
74. Id. at 630; see also id. at 627 ("[Tlhe United States constitutionally may
punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent
danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the
United States constitutionally may seek to prevent.").
75. Id. at 630-31.
76. Id. at 630.
77. G. Edward White, The Canonization of Holmes and Brandeis:
Epistemology and Judicial Reputations,70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 576, 579 n.11 (1995).
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and dogma such as those advocated by the Abrams defendants."
Thus, rational deliberation is an antidote to violence. But this belief
in rationalism is also of necessity coupled with a belief in the
fundamental stability of the American polity; only in extreme
circumstances will radical speakers be able to capture the public
imagination because rationalism will offset any tendency toward
radicalism.
In addition to assuming rationalism and stability in public
discourse, Holmes also assumes a model of public discourse that is
open and unmediated. In order for evil counsels to be corrected, the
debate has to be left open for other voices to refute the evil counsels.
This point is made explicit in Holmes's famous marketplace of ideas
metaphor, which also comes from his Abrams opinion. Holmes,
drawing on Milton and John Stuart Mill,"9 stated: "the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which [the] wishes [of the people] safely can be carried out."' Here,
too, the model of public discourse is of widespread citizen
participation in public discussions free from government
domination. The citizens upon whom the model relies are rational
and skeptical actors, prepared to engage in public debate to defeat
obvious falsehoods. The model also assumes that speech plays an
essential role in promoting peaceful, social change in a democratic
society. Speech is the avenue for discovering the truth that will
form the basis of rational social policy; it is the way that the wishes
of the people can be carried out by their government."' Although
Holmes did not phrase it in these terms, the fact that open public
discussion serves as a safety valve for public discontent is itself
another reason radical dissent need not lead to violence in a
properly functioning democracy.
This analysis of Holmes suggests that the clear and present
78. White, supra note 68, at 320 (noting the elitist underpinnings of
Holmes' theory).
79. MARcA. FRANKLIN ETAL., MASS MEDiA LAW 12 (6th ed. 2000).
80. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
81. Holmes made this point explicit in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting), in which he determined that there was no
likelihood that the defendant's Socialist manifesto would cause a "present
conflagration." Id. at 673. Holmes further stated, however, that: "If in the long
run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted
by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is
that they should be given their chance and have their way." Id. I believe the
emphasis here should be laid on the phrase "in the long run." Although Holmes
was famously a skeptic about human nature, I think it is obvious that Holmes
believed that socialist ideas would not prevail in the long run because they
would be defeated by rationalist argumentation in the marketplace of ideas.
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danger test (upon which our modern incitement doctrine is based)
depends on a particular form of public discourse and particular
types of citizens. Hence, the reason we can tolerate "expression of
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death"8 2 is
that our mode of public discourse has built-in safeguards against
mass violence.
These safeguards include rationalism as the
criterion for argumentation; engaged citizens who have the ability to
deliberate rationally on issues of social policy and to pursue change
through an open and unmediated public discourse; and a variety of
voices willing to refute those who call for violence and revolution. It
also assumes that government domination of the marketplace of
ideas will prevent citizens from receiving the information necessary
for rational deliberation that stems violence. Such analysis, then,
might form the beginning of an explanation and defense of American
exceptionalism in tolerating propaganda at home but not abroad.
However, such an analysis would be incomplete without
surveying the contributions of Louis Brandeis. Justice Brandeis
amplified upon, and added to, Holmes's themes in his lyrical
concurring opinion in Whitney v. California83-"arguably the most
important essay ever written, on or off the bench, on the meaning of
the first amendment."8 4 Anita Whitney was convicted of a felony
under California's Criminal Syndicalism Act for being a founding
member of the Communist Labor Party, whose platform advocated
"revolutionary class struggle."8 5 In applying the clear and present
danger test, Brandeis wrote that the state must show "either that
immediate serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, or
that the past conduct furnished reason to believe such advocacy was
then contemplated."86 More important than Whitney's refinement of
the clear and present danger test, though, is its comprehensive
discussion of why the State must tolerate speech it believes "to be
false and fraught with evil consequence." 7 In defining how far we
must go in tolerating potentially inciting speech, Brandeis wrote:
Those who won our independence by revolution were not
cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not
exalt order at the cost of liberty. To courageous, self-reliant
men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless
82. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630.
83. 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
84. Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage:
The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 653,
668 (1988).
85. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 363.
86. Id. at 376.
87. Id. at 374.

HeinOnline -- 37 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1022 2002

2002]

INCITEMENT ABROAD

1023

reasoning applied through the processes of popular
government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed
clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended
is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity
for full discussion.
If there be time to expose through
discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more
speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify
repression.
Although a complete analysis of the nuances of Brandeis's
opinion is beyond the scope of this Article,89 it is necessary to
illustrate what Brandeis assumed to be the background conditions
that allow us to tolerate speech we believe to be "fraught with evil
consequence[s]. " 90 First, it is noteworthy that Brandeis echoes many
of the themes expressed by Holmes in Abrams. An example of
Brandeis's faith in rationalism is his belief that speech is likely to
present a risk of imminent harm only when there is no opportunity
for "full discussion." 9' He echoes this sentiment elsewhere when he
identifies as a core principle of our democracy that "deliberative
forces should prevail over the arbitrary."92 Brandeis also assumes
that debate must be free and unfettered. Even more than Holmes,
Brandeis sees full citizen participation in public debate as essential
in a system committed to the ideal of self-government -indeed,
Brandeis stresses that "public discussion is a political duty.'
Hence, a democratic society can, and must, tolerate potentially
inciting speech because brave citizens will perform their public duty
in refuting what they believe to be "noxious doctrine."'
For Brandeis, then, a precondition for toleration of dissident
speech is what Vincent Blasi has termed "civic courage.'
Brandeis's opinion is replete with language about fear and courage.
Toleration of speech with which we disagree requires courage, and,
moreover, requires us to be "fearless" in insuring that proper

88. Id. at 377.
89. This work has admirably been performed by Blasi, supra note 84.
90. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374.
91. Id. at 377.
92. Id. at 375.
93. As G. Edward White has shown, "broadenling] the base of popular
involvement in government" and "encouragling] larger numbers of citizens to
participate in public discourse" were goals of the Progressive Movement. White,
supra note 68, at 315.
94. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375.
95. Id.
96. Blasi, supra note 84, at 690 ("To Brandeis, the measure of courage in
the civic realm is the capacity to experience or anticipate change-even rapid
and fundamental change-without losing perspective or confidence.").
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"reasoning [is] applied through the processes of popular
government. 9 7 The suppression of radical speech almost always is
an exercise of "irrational fears," and more precisely irrational fear of
"political change."" Rather than "silence coerced by law," radical
speech must be answered with "reason as applied through public
discussion."99 It is only through unfettered public discussion of
"grievances and proposed remedies" that the proper balance
between stability and change may be maintained."' As a corollary,
it is fair to assume that Brandeis is only willing to tolerate speech
advocating violence because democracy provides a corrective in the
form of free speech; the alternative, state coercion, is not only
unnecessary but dangerous and stifles the search for truth. At the
heart of Brandeis's opinion, therefore, lies a model of free and
unfettered public discourse participated in by a wide variety of
engaged and informed citizens performing their democratic duty of
self-governance."°'
Several other points are worth noting about the modern
American marketplace of ideas. It goes without saying that Holmes
and Brandeis, and indeed all of their successors, believed in the rule
of law, for they asserted the Constitution as an external constraint
on both the will of elected legislators and their own behavior. It is
also clear that the marketplace of ideas metaphor implicitly
envisions a thriving civil society, a realm where public debate can
occur free from governmental coercion."' Finally, although none of
the clear and present danger test cases dealt specifically with the
role of the press in the marketplace of ideas, it is clear that the press
plays an important role, not only as a conduit for speakers to get
their ideas into the marketplace, but also as a source of factual
97. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377.
98. Id. at 376-77 ("Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of
free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the
function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears.").
99. Id. at 375-76.
100. Id. at 375.
101. See White, supra note 68, at 325 (discussing the self-governance
rationale in Brandeis's Whitney concurrence).
102. See BERNARD LEWIS, WHAT WENT WRONG?: WESTERN IMPACT AND
MIDDLE EASTERN RESPONSE 110 (2002) (defining "civil society" as "part of
society, between the family and the state, in which the mainsprings of
association, initiative, and action are voluntary, determined by opinion or
interest or other personal choice, and distinct from-though they may be
influenced by-the loyalty owed by birth and the obedience imposed by force").
"Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an
organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be
lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses." Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S.
569, 574 (1941).
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information that can foster the search for truth. Like individual
speakers, the various media contribute to the marketplace of ideas;
and competition among competing media outlets is just as important
as competition among other types of speakers if the truth is to
emerge.
These, then, are the philosophical underpinnings of
Brandenburg (and indeed of much of modern First Amendment
jurisprudence), underpinnings that the Brandenburg opinion itself
does not really discuss but merely accepts as givens.'" At the time
Brandenburgwas decided, the Supreme Court had begun applying
the clear and present danger test to a variety of cases,"4 and
although the original form of the test has fallen out of use,'o it has
remained a crucial symbol of our toleration of radical speech. Why,
then, should we be hesitant to argue in favor of exporting this
cultural symbol to the Middle East?
Before answering this question, caveats are in order. First, the
marketplace of ideas is an ideal that has never been fully realized in
this country. As a practical matter, many viewpoints never enter
the marketplace of ideas. Some citizens are barred from meaningful
participation in the marketplace by lack of money or education;
others find that their class, race, or gender impairs their ability to
be heard. Moreover, giant media corporations, driven by profit
motives, may set the parameters of public debate according to what
they think may be profitable, rather than to what information
citizens need to know."0 6 Even the Internet, which allows many
more citizens access to a medium of mass communication, does not
guarantee that all citizens will be heard.' 7 And even if a fully
103. Indeed, the only "philosophical" discussions of the case are in the
concurrences of Justices Black and Douglas, who argue that the clear and
present danger test is insufficiently protective of free speech. Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449-50, 454 (1969) (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring); see
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 115 (1992) (viewing

Brandenburg as the legacy of the Holmes/Brandeis clear and present danger
test).
104. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318-24 (1957)
(distinguishing between advocacy of abstract doctrine and advocacy directed at
inciting or promoting violent, unlawful action); Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 507-11 (1951) (recognizing that the clear and present danger test had
become the dominant view, although the plurality did not apply it).
105. FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 79, at 83 (stating that the clear and present
danger test "is rarely used today").
106. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Inevitable Wasteland: Why the
Public Trustee Model of Broadcast Television Regulation Must Fail, 95 MNicu. L.

REV.2101, 2108-10 (1997).
107. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation &

Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DuKE L.J. 855, 894-98 (2000) (arguing that the
Internet has the potential to cure some of the "defects" in the marketplace of
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functioning marketplace of ideas were realized, there is no
guarantee that truth would emerge (as evidenced by the persistence
of such widespread popular delusions as the belief in U.F.O.s). Even
so, it is fair to conclude that the lack of government domination of
the American marketplace of ideas does allow more competition
within that marketplace, and that the often passionate and
aggressive debate that occurs there serves to reduce actual violence.
A second caveat is that the United States' commitment to
protecting potentially inciting propaganda has been strongest when
the speech at issue came from a fringe group not threatening the
majority's way of life. It was clear at the time Brandenburg was
decided that the Ku Klux Klan was a fringe group, albeit a terrifying
and violent one especially to African-Americans and Jews, which
could not hope to gain majority support in American society.
Moreover, the United States' commitment to broad protection of
inciting propaganda in wartime or times of national crisis has
proved embarrassingly limited. The clear and present danger test,
upon which the Brandenburg incitement standard is based, was
used to suppress the speech of communists, socialists, and other
radicals more often than it was used to protect them.' 8 Particularly
noteworthy in this regard is the xenophobia that undergirded many
of the Espionage Act prosecutions during and following World War
.19 In Abrams, for example, the trial judge "repeatedly reminded
the jury of the defendant's alien status and several times asked
Abrams, 'Why don't you go back to Russia?"'"" 0 Then, as now, the
United States was afraid of disloyal immigrant populations in its
midst during wartime, and these groups were targeted for
prosecution because of their speech. Thus, even in the United
States, our commitment to protecting potentially inciting speech is
more limited than our rhetoric would suggest. Nevertheless, it is
worthwhile to question whether the background assumptions that
lead us to assert toleration as an ideal within the United States are
even in play in the Middle East. If such assumptions do not hold, a

ideas).
108.

See generally Vincent Blasi, The PathologicalPerspective and the First

Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 456-57 (1985) (discussing the "fragility" of
our commitment to free speech "in times of stress"); Dow & Shieldes, supra note
10, at 1219-35 (recounting the "somewhat embarrassing legal history" of the
clear and present danger test).
109. See GRABER, supra note 63, at 80-81 (arguing that after World War I
was declared, "many Americans confused suppression of the political dissident
with suppression of the disloyal immigrant").
110. Id. at 81 (noting also that "[xenophobia continued to be closely
associated with censorship after the war").
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double standard for suppressing inciting speech may well be
justified.
IV.

AL-JAZEERA AND THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST

Contrast the American marketplace of ideas envisioned by
Holmes and Brandeis with the marketplace of ideas in the Arab
Middle East."' Stated bluntly, there are no guarantees at the
present time that rationalism will prevail in the Arab marketplace
of ideas, especially in matters relating to the United States. As elNawawy and Iskandar wrote in their study of Al-Jazeera, the
"average Middle Easterner" filters "public issues . . .through the
prism of conspiracy,"' and views the West as conspiring against
Islam and the Arab world.' Even Western media tend to be viewed
as a tool of cultural imperialism."' As one example of this filter of
conspiracy in operation, both the Gulf War and the attacks on
Bosnian Muslims have been widely perceived as "Christian
Crusades.""'

Perhaps, therefore, it should not be so shocking that a

poll taken in the aftermath of September 11 found that a majority of
Arab Muslims (sixty-one percent) did not believe that Arabs carried
out the attacks on the World Trade Center." 6

The Arab media feed this conspiracy-thinking with antiAmerican propaganda. For example, it was repeated throughout the
Arab media, including by Al-Jazeera, that Jews did not go to work at
111. Rodney A. Smolla, From Hit Man to Encyclopedia of Jiha& How to
Distinguish Freedom of Speech from Terrorist Training, 22 LoY. LA ENT. L.
REV. 479, 484 (2002) (asking "to what extent do we take into account social and
historical context . . . to determine if a person has gone beyond mere
'membership' [in a group with a violent agenda) or 'abstract advocacy' [of
violence]?").
112. EL-NAWAWY& ISKANDAR, supra note 16, at 61.
113. Id. at 60; see also HUNTINGTON, supra note 46, at 66 (contrasting
Western and non-Western world views).
114. See Hafez, supra note 20, at 13 (noting that this is a "widespread view
among Muslim thinkers").
115. TIBI, supra note 46, at 79-80.
116. Andrea Stone, Kuwaitis Share Distrust Toward USA, Poll Indicates,
USA TODAY, Feb. 27, 2002, at A7. However, this is not to say that Americans do
not hold stereotyped views of Arabs or that Americans do not receive
information about the Arab world through the prism of such stereotypes. See
Hafez, supra note 20, at 15 (noting the "often very one-sided view of Islam in
Western media"); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REv.
1575 (2002) (examining racial stereotyping of Arabs in the aftermath of
September 11, 2001); Gallup Poll Analysis, The Impact of the Attacks on
America (Sept. 25, 2001), at http'/wwv.gallup.com/poll/releases/prO10914c.asp
(noting that one in three Americans supports internment of Arabs after
September 11).
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the World Trade Center on September 11.117 Another rumor that
had currency in the Arab media was that the United States food
relief packages dropped in Afghanistan were poisoned. '
AntiSemitism of the worst kind, including allegations of "blood libel"
common in the Middle Ages, also feature prominently." 9 In this
setting, it is hard to have faith that rationalism will overcome
exhortations to violence or that the truth will ultimately emerge.
At least part of the explanation for the persistence of this
conspiracy thinking is the extent to which political leaders in the
Middle East have sponsored anti-American propaganda to maintain
control of an increasingly radicalized population.' In the last thirty
years, Islamic "fundamentalist" movements have threatened the
legitimacy of preexisting autocratic regimes in the Arab Middle
East. 12' A growing class of "unemployed and disaffected young
people"--the result of dramatic population growth and economic
stagnation-have been the most willing adherents to "Islamist
causes." 12 To understand the magnitude of this problem, consider
that Arab birthrates are the highest in the world, while labor force
participation is the lowest of any region." To respond to the threat
posed by this "youth bulge" of young radicals, 124 Middle Eastern
leaders use anti-American propaganda, not only to prove themselves
sufficiently Islamic (i.e., anti-Western), 125 but they also use antiAmerican propaganda to distract their citizens from their own failed

117. Campagna, supra note 15. But see EL-NAWAWY & ISKANDAR, supra note
16, at 64 (stating that A1-Jazeera has assisted in refuting some of the
conspiracy theories surrounding September 11).
118. Thom Shanker & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Warns Afghans That Taliban May
Poison Relief Food, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2001, at B2.
119. See Michael Slackman, The World Saudi Editor Retracts Article That
Defamed Jews, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2002, at A3.
120. See, e.g., HUNTINGTON, supra note 46, at 217 ("Muslim governments,
even the bunker governments friendly to and dependent on the West, have been
strikingly reticent when it comes to condemning terrorist acts against the
West."); Richard Cohen, The Ugly Arab Press, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2001, at
A21 ("Throughout the Arab world, the most ugly and ridiculous anti-American,
anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic diatribes are routinely published in the press or
aired on radio and television-and always with either the acquiescence or the
prompting of the government.").
121. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 46, at 111.
122. Id. at 211; see also id. at 112-13 (noting that the most highly educated
young people are amongst those most attracted to Islamist causes).
123. Fouad Ajami, The Crowd's Distraction,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr.
22, 2002, at 28.
124. Id; see also HUNTINGTON, supra note 46, at 112-13.
125. See TIBI, supra note 46, at 66 (observing that Islamic fundamentalism
has embraced modernity but rejected "Westernization").
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policies. 126 They thus "externalize" their costs-the social unrest
created by lack of economic development, political institutions, or
civil society in their countries-onto the United States. Standing
alone, this would be more than sufficient justification for saying that
Brandenburg'sincitement standard is not appropriate for export, at
least when the incitement in question is directed externally, rather
than internally (i.e., at the Arab governments themselves).
Thus, not only are the "evil counsels" common in Arab media
government-sponsored, but there are few voices willing or able to
correct them once they enter the marketplace of ideas."? With few
exceptions, Arab governments control, directly or indirectly, both
the domestic broadcast" and print media."
These governments
limit the stock of information available to their citizens on matters
126. Bassam Tibi, The Fundamentalist Challenge to the Secular Order tin the
Middle East, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 191, 198 (1999). Tibi states:
In the Arab world, the ruling elites are preoccupied with maintaining
power in their nation-states. They thus fail to address the issues that
give rise to social unrest and discontent and are unable to provide the
substantive stability, economic development and political institutionbuilding that would lead to more participation and greater
democratization.
Id.
127. Even though satellite television and the Internet have expanded the
uncensored information available in the Middle East, it is primarily the elites
who have access to these new media. See Hafez, supra note 20, at 1-2.
Moreover, although the number of indigenous media in the Middle East has
increased in the last ten years, "it is rather doubtful whether the new
indigenous media allow for greater freedom of speech than the state media." Id.
at 3-4.
128. DOUGLAS A. BOYD, BROADCASTING IN THE ARAB WORLD: A SURVEY OF TIlE
ELEcTRoNIc MEDIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST 5 (1999) (also noting, however, that
many people in the Arab world can obtain foreign radio broadcasts); Hafez,
supra note 20, at 4 ("Comparative analyses of global media development
consider the Middle Eastern media system the most closed and controlled in the
world.").
129. As historian Bernard Lewis has noted, "What comes out of the radio
and television set [in the Middle East] will be very largely determined by the
form of government that prevails in the country, and by the head of state or
head of government who operates it." BERNARD LEWIS, THE MIDDLE EAST: A
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LAST 2,000 YEARS 13-14 (1995); see HUNTINGTON, supra
note 46, at 113 ("The governments in the two score other Muslim countries larel
overwhelmingly nondemocratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military
regimes, personal dictatorships, or some combination of these, usually resting
on a limited family, clan, or tribal base. .. ."); see also Hafez, supra note 20, at 6
("The degree of press freedom corresponds to the nature of the respective
political system in the sense that systems that are semiauthoritarian and
patrimonial (Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, etc.) have allowed for more diversity than
totalitarian and technocratic (military) systems (Iraq, Syria, etc.).").
Authoritarian governments predominate in the region.
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of domestic policy by deploying such tactics as monopolistic control
of the print and broadcast media, strict licensing regulations, and
harassment and imprisonment of dissenting journalists. 3 '
A
primary role of the media is to carry government propaganda to the
people, not to provide objective news reports. 13' Even among the
available outlets for information, a substantial portion of the
population is foreclosed from accessing the information by
illiteracy. 132 This gives broadcasters like A1-Jazeera even more
power to use inflammatory coverage to incite the masses.
Brandeis's concept of public discussion as a political duty is,
thus, anathema, for Brandeis's ideal relied on engaged individuals
contributing their independent thoughts and beliefs to help forge
public consensus. Yet this notion of citizens as "free individuals,
and not as obliged members of collective entities" is absent in the
Arab world. 133 There, too, the lack of secular civil society-a realm of
association free of government or religious domination-helps
prevent the development of meaningful public discourse. Even AlJazeera, whose critical coverage of many governments in the region
is a stunning departure from the norm, has avoided all controversial
coverage of the Qatari government,134 choosing not to test its
supposed independence from the Emir's control. To the extent that
public consensus is deemed necessary, it is commanded by political
or religious authorities, 35 rather than emerging from the will of the
people. It is fair to conclude, therefore, that a fundamental pillar of
130. The Committee for Protecting Journalists, an international
organization, produces an annual report on the state of press freedom in the
Middle East and North Africa which can be accessed at Committee to Protect
Journalists, at http://www.cpj.org/attacks00/mideast00/mideast.html
(last
visited Oct. 8, 2002).
131. See BOYD, supra note 128, at 5; LEWIS, supra note 129, at 11-14; Hafez,
supra note 20, at 10 ("Many of the media do not, in fact, transfer 'knowledge'
and information but act as a government-controlled apparatus to create and
distribute pseudo-facts . .

").

132. HUNTINGTON, supra note 46, at 119.
133. See TIBI, supra note 46, at 193; Hussein Amin, Mass Media in the Arab
States Between Diversification and Stagnation: An Overview, in MASS MEDIA,
POLITICS & SOCIETY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 20, at 23, 39 (noting that in

the Arab world censorship is "expected as a form of civic responsibility");
Thomas M. Franck, Is Personal Freedom a Western Value?, 91 AM. J. INT'L L.
593, 602 (1997) (quoting Professor M.M. Slaughter as stating that the Arab
concept of self "is defined through traditions and concepts of honor. The
[Western] concept of the autonomous self requires the free speech principle; the
socially situated self of Islamic society necessarily rejects free speech in favor of
prohibitions against insult and defamation.").
134. EL-NAWAWY & ISKANDAR, supra note 16, at 86.
135. See Hafez, supra note 20, at 11 (noting use of mass media by
reactionary Islamist groups to further their agenda).

HeinOnline -- 37 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1030 2002

2002]

INCITEMENT ABROAD

1031

Brandenburg-rationaldeliberation by citizens engaged in open and
unmediated public discourse-is absent in much of the Middle East.
A final fundamental pillar of Brandenburg is also missing.
America is a stable democracy that provides avenues of peaceful
political change through elections, thereby ameliorating the need for
violence to achieve political goals or to vent rage at failed
government policies. These avenues are blocked in most countries
in the Arab world. The authoritarian regimes that govern the many
Arab countries do not hold elections," 6 and those that do hold
parliamentary elections often produce legislative bodies that are "too
weak to question certain national policies.1 37 The young, angry, and
disaffected masses have no way to make their will known to their
leaders except through violence, and the leadership controls violence
through harsh reprisals and channels it toward external targets. In
this volatile situation, the line between advocacy of violence and
incitement certainly must be drawn in a different place than it
would be drawn in the United States.
It is therefore possible to argue that the United States has not
applied a double standard of press freedom to Arab media or to AlJazeera itself. Although Al-Jazeera has been revolutionary in
harshly criticizing many of the governments in the Middle East
(Qatar excepted) and has brought issues to the table that simply
could not be heard through the government-controlled media, AlJazeera has also adopted a tabloid model of journalism, and its
programming panders to the rage of the Muslim street ' m
(particularly with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict).'3 In
the United States, this type of tabloid journalism is common, but
citizens can also turn to other news outlets to find a contrasting
view. In the Middle East, this clash of opposing viewpoints is
largely absent. By its own terms, therefore, Brandenburg should
not apply."4 And even applying Brandenburg,the radically different
136. But see TIBI, supra note 46, at 196 (noting that Jordan holds elections
and can boast of some democratic achievements).
137. Muhammad I. Ayish, The Changing Face of Arab Communications:
Media Survival in the Information Age, in MASS MEDIA, POLITICS & SOCIETY IN
THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 20, at 111, 123.

138. As Fouad Ajami has observed, "[a] political culture that yields itself to
the passions of 'the street' is a damaged culture." Ajami, supra note 123, at 28.
139. Ajami, supranote 21, at 50.
140. I am therefore in agreement with Laura Palmer, who has argued that
the American incitement standard "is the end product of the unique set of
historical and social circumstances that have shaped American society."
Palmer, supra note 12, at 205. My primary argument in this section is that
Brandenburg'sincitement standard should not apply in the Arab Middle East
because the fundamental preconditions for a functioning marketplace of ideas
do not exist. A legitimate response, however, is that protecting incendiary
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context makes the line between advocacy of violence and incitement
much easier to cross.
V.

CONCLUSION: WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS

My hope is that this Article will serve as a reminder of why the
United States can and should tolerate radical dissent even in a time
of war. I also hope to make the case that the United States can,
consistently with its own First Amendment ideals, request that
Middle Eastern governments rein in inflammatory anti-American
propaganda in their own media. The dramatic differences between
the American marketplace of ideas and the Arab marketplace of
ideas justify restricting Brandenburgto the unique soil out of which
it arose.
The fact that United States policy is defensible, however, may
ultimately be beside the point. By attacking Al-Jazeera, the United
States government opened itself up to the charge of applying a
double standard in the Middle East. Even if this charge is untrue,
the perception that the United States applies a double standard on
press freedom can only further hamper efforts to fix our "image
problem" in the Middle East. Moreover, the Bush Administration's
attacks on A1-Jazeera run the risk of enhancing, rather than
diminishing, A-Jazeera's credibility with its viewers. As the United
States government seems to have realized, it is far better to attempt
to rebut inflammatory speech (even at the risk of having our
positions distorted), than to appear to attack A1-Jazeera's editorial
freedom.
Having United States officials appear on Al-Jazeera cannot be
our only weapon of public diplomacy, of course. Fortunately, the
Bush Administration rejected the Pentagon's idea of feeding false
information to foreign journalists."' Instead, in typical American
fashion, we have hired a Madison Avenue advertising expert to
package our policies for an Arab audience.'42 Under her direction,
Voice of America's Arabic service has been repackaged as Radio
Sawa (Radio Together) and is gaining market share rapidly. "
expression in the Middle East will help create a marketplace of ideas. While it
is true that Brandenburg both depends on and helps constitute a particular
model of political discourse, I would argue that protection of incendiary
expression, standing alone, will only undermine attempts to constitute a more
rational model of discourse in the Arab Middle East.
141. Pentagon Closes PropagandaOffice, QUILL, May 1, 2002, at 9.
142. Ajami, supra note 21, at 78 (noting that Colin Powell appointed
Charlotte Beers as under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public
affairs).
143. Felicity Barringer, U.S. Messages to Arab Youth, Wrapped in Song,
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2002, at A8; Jane Perlez, U.S. Is Trying to Market Itself To

HeinOnline -- 37 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1032 2002

2002]

INCITEMENT ABROAD

1033

There is even talk of an American-sponsored twenty-four-hour
Arabic news channel going head to head with AI-Jazeera. '
Unfortunately, winning "hearts and minds" in the Arab Middle
East is no easy task.145
Institution-building, which includes
providing subsidies to independent media, supporting secular
education that fosters critical thinking, and supporting the
development of civil society, must precede any real change in the
Arab marketplace of ideas. 146 And there is little indication that most
Middle Eastern regimes would or even could commit to building
these types of institutions, for regime change might be the inevitable
result. It is easier by far for them to displace their citizens'
discontent by demonizing the United States. This is not to say that
the United States' conduct in the Middle East has been blamelesscertainly we have supported tyrannical despots for strategic
purposes. Yet even though the United States has been guilty of
applying double standards in some areas, the failure to export
Brandenburg's incitement standard to protect governmentsponsored anti-American propaganda is not one of them.

Young, SuspiciousArabs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2002, at Al.

144. Hafez, supra note 20, at 1-2 ("To suggest that access to foreign media
alone could revolutionize Middle Eastern societies, wipe away authoritarian
rule, or modernize traditionalist lifestyles would be rather simplistic.").
145. See Simon, supra note 17, at 29 (quoting Washington Post media
reporter Howard Kurtz as urging Bush to win the "hearts and minds in the
Arab world" by going on Al-Jazeera).
146. See, e.g., David Hoffman, Beyond Public Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFF.,
Mar.-Apr. 2002, at 84.
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